Impatience is not a virtue when it comes to resolving a conflict in which one is not a primary party. As noted many times here before, the primary parties must be looking to terminate hostilities before any diplomatic solution is even possible (the suggestion that Europe try to throw the Russians out of Ukraine by force is fanciful at best and delusional at worst - the Europeans would be lucky if they could keep the Russians out of their own countries, let alone conduct offensive operations).
It's worth restating some basic truths about this conflict, as perspectives seem to be diverging from both them and reality.
- Ukraine is not an ally. It has no formal military ties to the US, NATO, or the EU. It is a state that was attacked by another that is viewed as generally hostile to Western interests, thus it follows that it is in Western interests to assist it in its defense. This does not mean that it is necessarily desirable that Ukraine win decisively; an argument can be made that the best outcome for Russia's rivals is to maintain the stalemate in Ukraine for as long as possible without risking escalation, as this will weaken Russia more effectively than any other outcome.
For those that like to employ the flawed WWII analogy, consider if the Czechs had fought rather than acquiescing in 1938, occupying the Germans for several years, forcing them to consume resources and manpower. In the meantime, the rest of Western Europe would likely have raised the alarm and begun rearming, strengthening their defenses, potentially to the extent that Germany would have had to delay or modify their plans, perhaps confining themselves to attacking Russia (the key stated objective of Lebensraum, and not an ally of any Western country at the time). This hypothetical bears much closer resemblance to the current situation than does the historical fact of 1938.
- Russia has no particular interest in halting the conflict in sub-optimal circumstances. Yes, it is costing it a lot, but it is also providing Putin with excellent clear affirmation of his basic domestic narrative, that Russia is the target of Western aggression, and that his regime is the only thing preventing humiliation similar to what was seen in the 1990s or worse. Further, any repression, privation, or other unpleasantness that the Russia people might suffer becomes the fault of the West, not Putin. Only a significant victory improves Putin's domestic position; anything short of that weakens his standing and constrains his domestic policy options. It is worth noting that Putin's regime, like all authoritarian ones, is brittle, but continuing the war in Ukraine is paradoxically helping him to manage this rather than hurting him. His targeted removals of potential sources of domestic rivalry have been intended to eliminate risks of internal opposition (external opposition is not a serious concern).
- Ukraine is dependent on external support, and this limits its options. Much of the friction between Zelensky and Western leaders has come from his unwillingness to acknowledge this fact. This is not an unusual point of contention (consider both sides in the Vietnam or Korean Wars and their respective relationships with their patrons), but that doesn't make it any less of a factor. Because of this, if Ukraine's strategy does not align with Western interests, the former will struggle to achieve its objectives. It may be fighting to defend itself, but the nature of the relationship means that Ukraine must take external factors into account; failing to do so will weaken its ability to succeed. This is a significant part of the push to develop its domestic arms industry (something it had significant experience with during the Soviet era), which is probably the most critical factor in maintaining some form of independence in the long run, regardless of external support.
- Meanwhile, the impact of the conflict on Western posture has been arguably nothing but beneficial, especially for the US. While the Europeans will struggle to figure out how to pay for their increased defensive capabilities, US industry will likely reap significant benefits, especially in the short term. If the costs are too high, however, Europe may see the rise of governments less willing to support Ukraine, and thus less willing to continue spending on their own defense (a flawed bit of logic, but one that often appeals to domestic voters). Another beneficiary is China, which has cut its oil import costs by buying discounted Russian oil, and has been able to focus on its priorities with limited US interference; the Chinese certainly have no interest in seeing the conflict in Ukraine ended.
None of this may be pleasant to acknowledge, but that doesn't make it any less factual. All parties may say they want peace, but what that peace looks like is very different in every case. Only when the range of individually acceptable conditions for peace begin to converge around certain common interests will the possibility of a settlement emerge. At the moment, it doesn't look like either side is likely to win or lose outright, and neither is willing to give the other what it wants, so the only remaining possibility is to keep fighting.
